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Educational Policymaking and Hegemony: Monolithic Voices from Civil Society  
 
This article discusses the changes in basic education in Turkey, with a 
particular focus on religious education and its ramifications for the 
education system. The latest education reform, 4+4+4 (or 4+), the largest 
education reform in recent Turkish history, has brought radical changes 
to the school system regarding religious education. For this research, 
journalists and teacher unionists were interviewed to investigate civil 
society’s perspective on the reform. Several themes were extracted from 
the data analysis but this article focuses on one dominant theme, namely 
the rise of religiosity. We argue that the state and its private associations 
(i.e., media, unions, and political parties) are actively encouraging a 
process of Islamisation and a gradual but stronger emphasis on Islam in 
public sphere in order to consolidate its hegemonic dominance.    
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Introduction 
On 15th of July 2016, Turkey witnessed a coup attempt reportedly by the 
Gülenists, an international religious group led by a Turkish preacher living in the US. In 
its, aftermath, the Justice and Development Party (henceforth: JDP, in Turkish AKP: 
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), who are currently in government, dismissed more than 
100,000 public employees, including teachers and academics, due to their suspected 
involvement in the failed coup (New York Times 2016).  
Two months later, the 19th of September marked the first day of the new 
school year in Turkey. 18 million children started school and began their first class of 
the year with an introductory session about the failed coup attempt (Sabah 2016). 
Schools showed a documentary and the pupils received booklets about it, whilst some 
went further by staging re-enactments of the coup day (Cumhuriyet 2016; Hürriyet 
2016). Subsequently, the Ministry of National Education (MEB) announced that the 
coup would be included in national textbooks and curricula, and pupils would be 
expected to go on school trips to key coup locations (MEB 2016). Symbolically, this 
response to the failed coup is a vivid example of how education plays an essential part 
in the JDP government’s leadership and how the education system has been directly 
affected by the political affairs of the country.  
 
In this research, we argue that Turkey has been witnessing a return of religion 
both in political and civil society and that education is one of the main instruments 
being used to help bring about and consolidate this change. The aim of this article is to 
understand how the 4+ reforms seek to challenge the country’s secularist tradition and 
shift the school system in favour of one based on religious principles through, for 
example, the active encouragement of new religious schools (imam hatip schools). By 
promoting religious education in this manner, the government appears both to be 
acting on genuine religious beliefs but is also deliberately seeking to use religion to 
consolidate popular support, especially amongst large sections of the population that 
are religiously more conservative. We also seek to demonstrate how the reforms have 
been contested within civil society, but how the government has been able co-opt key 
sections of the media and the teacher union movement in order to construct a broad 
hegemonic alliance. 
This article begins with an overview of Islam’s place in Turkey as part of a 
presentation of the wider context. The second section specifically focuses on the 4+ 
education reform and religious education in Turkey. It is followed by an explanation of 
the theoretical framework, which draws on Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and civil 
society. The fourth section then explains the research methods undertaken for this 
study. The final section evaluates the data from two key elements of civil society, 
teacher unions and the media, within a Gramscian framework. These groups’ voices 
lead us to question whether the 4+, especially its provisions regarding religious 
education, contributes to an increased quality of education and redressing previous 
biases, as the JDP claims, or is better seen as a means of reinforcing the JDP’s 
hegemonic leadership and, therefore, as a threat to the secular foundation of the 
state. Whilst this is not the first time Turkey has witnessed the rise of Islam in 
education and politics, the current approach is proving significantly more successful 
than previous attempts. Consequently, the questions this article addresses are: how is 
the 4+ education reform helping to establish an Islamic hegemony, and to what extent 
is civil society contributing to construction of this hegemony.  
We argue that education is being used as part of a state apparatus to maintain 
the government’s power and convey its ideology through the latest education reform. 
This leads us to investigate the role of civil society actors in this process. The research 
is significant due to its contribution to our understanding of how education plays an 
important part in shaping a country’s future directions through its role in the 
formation of religious practices and discourses.  
 
Research Context:  
 
Islam has a long history in Turkey: from 1299 until the foundation of the 
Republic in 1923, the Ottoman Empire incorporated Islam in its state structure 
(Zurcher 2004). However, the successor regime, under Kemal Ataturk, was avowedly 
secularist, republican and modernising. Until 1946, the Turkish Republic was ruled by a 
single party, the RPP (the Republican People’s Party). Even after the first multi-party 
elections, the RPP remained in power until 1950. In spite of this 27-year rule, the new 
secularist order did not remain in any way unchallenged, particularly in terms of 
support amongst the rural population (Nohl 2008). The May 1950 general elections 
saw the Democrat Party (DP) come to power. Whilst the DP did not challenge the 
Kemalist constitution, they drew much of their support from more rural areas and 
were somewhat less pro-Western and anti-Islamic than the RPP (Kaplan 2006). During 
the 1950s, the number of mosques and imam hatip schools (training schools for 
Muslim clerics) increased (Heper 2011). However, on 27th May 1960, a military coup 
took place. Worsening economic conditions had made the DP increasingly unpopular 
and Kemalist military officers took the opportunity to attempt to protect the 
Republican tradition. Though a minority RPP government was returned in the 1961 
elections, the 1965 elections saw the rise of the Justice Party (JP), a DP successor 
group. The JP were strongly pro-Western and sought to steer a middle ground 
between an increasingly left-leaning RPP and religious conservatives. During this time, 
imam hatip schools continued to grow and, further, women were also given access to 
them (Nohl 2008). Another military coup took place in 1980 following which all 
political parties were shut down (Heper 2011). However, the general trend away from 
Kemalism and leaning more towards an assertive Islamic stance continued in spite of 
the military’s interventions. The 1980s saw the rise of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, 
which asserted the inherently Muslim nature of Turkey and which began to influence 
the education system. For example, religious education was made compulsory in both 
primary and secondary schools during this period (Zurcher 2004).  
The military intervened again through 1997’s “post-modern coup”, leading to 
the government’s resignation. Their intention had been to reduce the number of imam 
hatip schools (Akboga 2015). Crucially, by extending basic compulsory education to 
eight years, the Security Council aimed to eliminate imam hatip middle schools (Nohl 
2008). As we shall see below, the issues pertaining to extending schooling and the 
place of imam hatip schools are central to the current debates and disputes about 
education and religiosity. 
 
The Age of the JDP 
 
When the JDP initially came to power, it sought to present a modernising image 
by supporting European Union (EU) membership, implementing democratic reforms, 
and advocating peace with the Kurds and supporting minority rights in order to gain 
consent from different sections and groups within society (JDP Programme 2002). Even 
people from opposing positions began to believe that the JDP had found a middle 
ground between secularism and Islam (Göl 2009), and some saw the JDP as offering a 
way out of what was perceived as Kemalist elitism (Atasoy 2009) and towards a more 
heterogeneous society (Kadir 2014). This can be described as the JDP’s initial attempt 
to construct a hegemonic alliance.  
In education, the JDP initially pursued an inclusive and pluralist approach. From 
entering power in 2001, this was closely linked to a wider strategy of securing EU 
accession. The first major change to the education system began in 2002 with the EU-
sponsored Support the Basic Education Programme that was intended to improve the 
conditions of primary school education in preparation in order to meet the associated 
conditions of EU membership. However, with the accession process stalling in the late 
2000s and the JDP power becoming consolidated, the JDP abandoned its attempts to 
align its education system with the West and began a progressively more Islamic turn 
in education policy. During its first term of rule (2002-2007), the JDP did not take 
immediate action to lift the ban on the Islamic headscarf, nor did they make any 
radical changes with regards to religious education. However, after its second and 
third victories (2007 and 2011) consolidated the party’s power, especially amongst 
rural and more religiously-minded voters, the JDP was encouraged to make alterations 
to increase the rise of religiosity in the public space (Kaya 2015). The party waited until 
its third term of office to make radical changes to the education system. 
The 4+ was implemented immediately after the JDP was re-elected in 2011. It 
ostensibly extended the length of schooling from eight to twelve years and brought 
overall structural changes to the education system that mark it out as the most 
ambitious education reform since the early Republican era. Before 4+, the education 
system was based on eight years of schooling, divided into the primary and secondary 
levels, which did not allow pupils to leave basic education and attend any type of 
vocational schooling before having completed their eight years. 4+ separated the 
education system into three different levels, primary, middle and secondary, and 
paved the way for pupils to choose different types of compulsory schooling at the end 
of primary school. The school types officially include basic schooling, vocational 
schools and distance education. Nevertheless, in practice vocational schools mean 
imam hatip (religious) schools, as there are no other vocational schools that provide 
middle school education (Gün and Baskan 2014). The 4+ reform, therefore, allows 
pupils to enter imam hatip schools at the age of ten. Unsurprisingly, this move has 
been hugely unpopular with secular commentators (Egitim Is 2016).  
In 2012, immediately before the 4+ legislation passed, the government claimed 
that the reform was intended to be more pluralistic and democratic than previous 
reforms (JDP 2012). However, critics suggested that the changes the government were 
suggesting were not designed to improve the education system but to spread the JDP’s 
political and religious ideology (e.g., Inal and Akkaymak 2012). The expansion of imam 
hatip schools has become one of the key fault lines in this controversy, hence their 
centrality to this paper.  
Imam hatip schools were first opened in 1924 to replace madrassas. There 
were only 29 such schools, initially designed solely to train imams (preachers) (Çakmak 
2009); hence, they were seen as vocational schools. However, numbers grew from the 
1950s and the link to preacher training was weakened. As we saw above, the 1997 
coup sought to reverse this. However, the 4+ re-established imam hatip middle 
schools, which subsequently saw rapidly increasing enrolment. 
 
Table 1: Imam Hatip Lower Secondary Schools (middle schools, age group: 10 
to 14). Adapted from: Ministry of National Education Strategy Development 
Presidency, National Education Statistics.  
 
Academic Year Student Number Number of schools  
2012-2013 94 467 1 099 
2013-2014 240 015 1 361 
2014-2015 385 830 1 591 
2015-2016 524 295 1 961 
The JDP remains openly supportive of religious education, and the opening of imam 
hatip middle schools has provided religious education to pupils as young as ten years 
old. There has also been an increase in the number of religious courses in the national 
curricula. These recent changes suggest that the state has been using education 
policies to shape a new public ideology, as will be discussed in the following section. 
 
Theoretical Framework: Hegemony, Politics and Educational Policy 
 
This article draws ideas from Gramsci’s concepts of “hegemony” and “civil 
society” to portray the state’s role in society and how education policies play an 
important part in maintaining the state’s supremacy.  
For Gramsci (1971), hegemony describes a situation where a social group or a 
class exercises “intellectual and moral leadership” to dominate opposition groups. This 
social group or class seeks to avoid, where possible, exercising control through 
coercion but rather seeks to shape the oppressed groups’ ‘common sense’ through 
ideological means (Gramsci 1971). In this way, consent is counterposed to coercion 
(although elements of both always co-exist). Education is one of the tools to build a 
new common sense: by being educated within the dominant system, people’s 
common sense develops in such a way as to consolidate and reinforce this system 
(Gramsci 1971). This has generated rich international literature on hegemony and 
education (e.g., Mayo 2010 and 2015; Pizzolato and Holst 2017). Hegemony, as Mayo 
argues, is an on-going process of power struggles: “it is never complete and open to 
negotiation and renegotiation” (Mayo 2010, 24), and education is seen as central to 
these processes. 
In the context of Turkey, the importance of hegemony lies in helping us to 
understand how the ruling group uses cultural and moral values in education to 
promote its own ideology and to develop the type of hegemonic alliances that can 
sustain its power. The Turkish Gramscian tradition focuses on the replacement of a 
secularist hegemony with an Islamic one (e.g., Atasoy 2009; Tuğal 2009). This paper 
argues that education has been one of the key tools employed in this process to create 
this new hegemony. For the JDP to consolidate its hegemonic power, it was necessary 
to win legitimacy and consent among the Turkish population, or at the very least large 
sections of it. We argue that education has played a key role in securing this consent, 
in part because of the key role that education plays in civil society.  
Civil society can be described as that part of the social system which is neither 
the coercive power of the state, nor the realm of the market and exchange. Rather, it 
is a range of institutions (both state and non-state) in which hegemonic power is 
exercised. Such institutions include education and social welfare services (often state 
institutions) but also the media, trade unions, religious bodies and voluntary 
organisations (see Altinors 2016; Heper & Demirel 1996; Shukla 2009 for discussions of 
the media as civil society). This inclusion of state and non-state bodies led Gramsci to 
argue that the political state and civil society were not separate but “one and the same 
thing” (Gramsci 1971, 60).  
Thus, the Gramscian concept of civil society refers to the cultural institutions of 
the state. Social institutions such as schools, the law and mass media, which are 
considered part of a civil society, are never neutral but rather serve the interests of the 
dominant class in order to generate consent and the cultural bedrock of power (Mayo 
1994, 15). Civil society is “symbiotically connected to the state; and as the integral 
state, they produce hegemony together. Civil society is neither a necessarily 
progressive entity nor the sphere of freedom; it is rather the sphere of hegemony” 
(Altinors 2016, 74).  For Gramsci, understanding civil society was critical because this 
was the space in which common sense was forged and, indeed, contested. In Turkey, 
Dikici-Bilgin (2009, 109) argues that civil society has become “a site for hegemonic 
struggles (…) as a counter-hegemonic force”. Civil society can act as a sphere through 
which to organise opposition and create counterhegemonic movements. The JDP 
government, already dominant in political society, has been constructing, through the 
institutions of civil society, an alternative hegemony to the existing secularist 
hegemony. Within Turkish civil society, the concern of this article focuses specifically 
on the role of education unions and the media. These are just two elements of civil 
society, but in relation to educational issues they play a key role in determining how 
educational discourse is framed and therefore in determining how education reforms 
are able to play a hegemonic role in society as a whole. 
Teacher unions are a key site of struggle regarding the meaning of education 
and accordingly this is a highly politicised space in Turkey. There are three main 
teachers’ unions: Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası (Egitim-Sen), Eğitimciler Birliği 
Sendikası (Egitim-Bir-Sen) and Türkiye Egitim, Ögretim ve Bilim Hizmetleri Kolu Kamu 
Çalışanları Sendikası (Türk- Eğitim-Sen). There is a visible tension between these 
unions, especially between Egitim-Bir-Sen and Egitim-Sen. They hold strongly 
contrasting political views, which “is a determining factor in their attitudes towards the 
general policies and educational reforms” (Buyruk 2015, 157). Egitim–Sen is seen as a 
left-wing trade union and promoter of a secular and scientific education, and is 
Turkey’s only Education International Affiliate (the international confederation of 
education unions). It has published various critical articles and reports about the 4+ 
education system. On the other hand, Egitim-Bir-Sen takes a different standpoint 
about 4+ and the education system as a whole. It is known for its traditional and 
conservative perspectives on education, views which coincide with those of the JDP. 
Türk-Eğitim-Sen is known for its nationalist and traditionalist perspectives, and 
accordingly this union’s views align with those of the Nationalist Movement Party. 
 
Also of considerable importance in framing educational policy discourse is the 
media, described by Mayo (2015, 11) as “a form of a public pedagogy; a vehicle for 
ideological influence”. Indeed, Gramsci argued that the press was “the most dynamic 
part of the ideological structure” (Gramsci 1971, 381). In recent years, the Turkish 
government has been widely criticised on the international stage for its excessive 
control over the media and journalists, particularly those sources considered critical of 
the ruling party (Akser and Baybars-Hawks 2012; Freedom House 2014; BBC 2015; 
Deutsche Welle 2013). Private media groups have been targeted, such as Dogan Media 
Group, which owned the country’s leading newspaper, Milliyet. It was fined and 
eventually forced to sell its holdings to a pro-government group (Freedom House 
2014). After this, Milliyet “laid off important critical columnists”. As Freedom House 
(2014, 5) notes, most mainstream newspapers “have become mouthpieces for the 
government” as hegemonic tools to consolidate the JDP’s power (Altinors 2016). 
Moreover, in the aftermath of the failed coup, the unions and media 
organisations were the first institutions to come under investigation by the 
government. Educators and journalists are amongst the two groups most likely to have 
experienced post-coup reprisals (dismissals, suspensions and sometimes 
imprisonment). This indicates that the media and the unions are key components in 
the battle of ideas in modern Turkey, and that these institutions within civil society 
cannot be seen to be separate from this on-going hegemonic struggle.  
 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
This paper offers new data to examine the question of rising religiosity in 
Turkish schooling through reporting on data collected between 2013 and 2016. In this 
paper, we focus on the interviews that were carried out with teacher union members 
and journalists.  
Teacher unions published a considerable amount of work on the 4+ reform, 
and some have played “important roles in the generation and implementation of 
education policies with the strategies that they developed” (Buyruk 2015, 147). 
Interviews were conducted with a total of seven union officials from three different 
unions. The roles of the participants in these unions were: three chairmen (General 
Secretary level), two district union presidents, and two senior union officers. At 
present, there are around 40 teacher unions in Turkey, but we selected the three 
biggest unions as presented above. One of these unions saw a large number of its 
members detained after the coup.  
Conducting interviews with the mainstream newspapers in Turkey provided 
insights into the freedom of the media and into the extent to which the government 
has been monitoring how educational changes are reflected within the media. The 
media is essential for shaping the public’s perception of changing reforms. Interviews 
were conducted with the lead education correspondents from five key newspapers. 
Two of these newspapers are known to be pro-government, two more liberal, and one 
pro-secularist. One had a number of its staff detained after the coup, but none were 
closed down.  
It was challenging to access participants at first. To gain access, it is important 
to find contacts that can act as links. Once the contacts had been reached and an 
interview arranged with one of the participants, the rest followed. We employed a 
snowballing technique where every participant provided a reference to someone else 
they knew.  
Given the febrile atmosphere, anonymity was a key issue, particularly as many 
of the interviewees were public figures. A considerable amount of information was 
offered in confidence and off-the-record. Prior to each interview, the confidentiality 
and anonymity of the participants was guaranteed. Both groups are referred to here as 
TUP (teacher union participant) or EDJ (education journalist) with a suffix number, as 
naming their union or newspaper would make their identification possible. The 
interviews lasted around 50 minutes and focused mainly on the changes the 4+ had 
brought and, further, their views on educational policymaking in Turkey. 
 
The data was analysed through thematic coding. Patterns in the interviews and 
documents were closely examined. The coding was completed manually and the 
transcripts divided into relevant categories and themes. The categories were 
reanalysed for recurring themes that helped us make sense of the data. Initially, the 
data was coded without reference to the Gramscian theoretical framework, which 
Braun and Clark (2006) refer to as inductive thematic analysis. The key themes were 
then analysed within a Gramscian theoretical framework, which provided us with a 
more detailed analysis of certain aspects of the data. Several themes were identified 
but this paper focuses only on the rise of religiosity, debates over the headscarf, 
expansion of new religious schools, and the configuring of the curriculum to promote 
religious education across all schools. 
 
 
Findings: The rise of religiosity  
 
In this section, we focus on how religion and religious education are perceived 
by two polarised groups. Opponents of the 4+ reform have argued that the 4+ is 
religiously oriented and aims to raise pupils with Islamic values. The supporters of the 
reform, however, responded to these claims by stating that educational reforms prior 
to the 4+ were aimed at raising homogenous groups of pupils who were only taught 
secularist principles, which had led to the repression of Islam’s heritage in Turkish 
society. As one interviewee put it: ‘the previous (secularist) governments did not allow 
any room for people who had different ideologies and did not even let those people, 
especially women (due to their headscarves), take place in the public sphere’ (TUP3). 
Similarly, some participants also expressed the view that the secularists alienated 
them and now it was their turn to participate in the public sphere. In both groups, 
religious and non-religious, there were many references to “us” and “them”, which 
indicated the on-going battle between Islam and secularism through the use of 
language:   
We (meaning women wearing headscarves) were not allowed to work 
in institutions of the state; we were not even allowed to attend 
universities. Now, thanks to the JDP party we can do whatever we want. 
They (the secularists) thought we could only cook and clean the house, 
they did not think that we had any opinions. One of the women’s think 
tanks did not even let me in their meetings (TUP3).  
Women who are practicing Muslims felt oppressed by the previous regime and the JDP 
stood by these ‘victims’.  
The JDP’s political actions and its party ideology are based on several different 
discourses ranging from neo-conservatism, neoliberalism, Islamism, victimisation, to 
anti-laicism. In this context, the JDP promoted a discourse of victimisation through 
which it has managed to “win the hearts” of the masses (Kaya 2015, 48). The female 
supporters of the JDP believe that the party is providing them justice. Many devout 
Muslims see the JDP as their saviour (Çınar 2018). Moreover, the JDP, by giving 
religiously-oriented women more opportunities in the public sphere, has gained 
women’s consent. Many women, regardless of their beliefs, supported the JDP’s 
decision to lift the headscarf ban in universities and state institutions. However, the 
JDP expanded the law and permitted the use of the headscarf in primary and 
secondary schools in the name of religious freedom. While some supported this policy 
change, others argued that introducing headscarf use in primary schools was an 
ideological tool for the government to condition children at an earlier age. For 
instance, Cin et al. (2018) show that religion and religious schools are used as an 
intervention strategy to increase girls’ enrolment in primary schools in Eastern Turkey, 
as well as a tool with which to promote the neo-conservative agenda of the 
government. 
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage of this policy change is the possibility of 
polarisation among students and teachers. In the context of Turkey, where the 
dominant religion is Islam, wearing headscarves has different connotations and 
signifies the level of devotion the students have. It can also indicate a political 
standpoint. The Islamic headscarf in Turkey has, therefore, become a source of 
polarisation and a symbol of a wider political struggle. It is important to note that in 
imam hatip schools, female students have already had the choice of wearing 
headscarves and most imam hatip school parents send their children to those schools 
to practice their religion.   
 
The Imam Hatip School Debate 
 
The government believes that imam hatip schools represent a necessary step in 
addressing the grievances of religiously conservative community and have called them 
”invaluable institutions that graduate generations of youth who vitalize Turkey’s 
future” (Ozgur 2015, 27). In 2012, President Erdogan (Prime Minister at the time) 
openly declared that his, and his party’s aim was to “raise religious youths” (Hürriyet 
2012). As table one shows, there has been a strong increase in the number of imam 
hatip school and enrolment at the middle school level, with a smaller increase at the 
high school level. 
During the interviews, there were two different opinions expressed on the 
imam hatip school issue. On the one hand, advocates of imam hatip schools identified 
a clear demand for these schools. However, on the other, opponents of the reform 
challenged the argument that the public wants/needs more imam hatip schools. As 
one of the participants explained: 
 
They keep saying that there is this great need for imam hatip schools 
but we actually know that they had to close some down due to not 
having enough pupils. We know these things because we write articles, 
report about it every day. Go around your neighbourhood you will see 
how many imam hatip schools have recently been opened and how 
many pupils are actually attending these schools (EDJ3).  
 
As we showed in tables one and two, many imam hatip schools were opened 
after the 4+ reform was passed. Consequently, it has been debated as to whether 
there are more imam hatip schools now than are actually needed. Another participant 
was more vocal about the issue, reacting to all newly built imam hatip schools:  
There are imam hatip schools everywhere now. Do we really need this 
many? Did anyone discuss whether children need religious education at 
the age of 10? Do they need to attend imam hatip schools as early as 
this? (EDJ2).  
 
The imam hatip school debate brings up an important notion of Gramsci: ‘organic 
intellectuals’: “the dominant group’s deputies exercising subaltern functions of social 
hegemony and political government” (Gramsci 1971, 118). In this light, imam hatip 
schools might be considered to be producing the organic intellectuals of the future, 
and considered central to the realisation of the JDP’s bid for long-term hegemonic 
power. Indeed, it is argued by some respondents that imam hatip schools were 
designed for the sole purpose of creating an intellectual movement that promotes the 
JDP’s ideological and political discourse. One participant said:  
 
By re-establishing imam hatip middle schools, the state helps spread 
these schools. The state should be impartial towards an issue like 
religion, but it is not. The political government that came to power is 
religiously rooted and they are raising new generations with their 
mentality (EDJ4). 
 
However, people who come from religious backgrounds believe that the issue of imam 
hatip schools is one of freedom of choice and that the state has a responsibility to its 
citizens to provide as many imam hatip schools as are wanted (TUP4). One of the 
proponents of this position referred to the issue of school attendance by female 
pupils. The participant talked about how more traditional and conservative families in 
Turkey did not want to send their daughters to school beyond the primary level:  
 
I see this (reopening of middle school level of imam hatips) as offering 
the option. Parents who want their children to have secular education 
can send them to basic schools. The state must provide the alternative, 
then it is up to its citizens to opt for this alternative or not. Turkey does 
not only consist of Istanbul and Ankara. In the East of Turkey, in small 
cities, there are many families who do not send their daughters to 
school due to not having the option of imam hatip middle schools 
(EDJ5). 
 
Hence, apparently paradoxically, classic liberal ideas such as freedom of choice and 
women’s rights are utilised to justify the strengthening of religious education, not 
typically part of the liberal “tool kit”. 
The participants who supported imam hatip schools naturally did not agree 
with the 1997 Basic Education Act, which sought to eliminate imam hatip middle 
schools. For instance, one interviewee said: 
 
The 4+ is not an imposition like the previous reform. Before the 4+, the 
logic was that the pupils would have the same syllabus and all pupils 
would graduate with the same mentality (referring to Kemalism). Now, 
pupils can choose from different options. There are elective courses, 
vocational secondary schools, imam hatip secondary schools, there are 
lots of alternatives. It was not like this before (TUP2). 
 
However, the claim that there are wider options can be questioned. The only 
difference in terms of offering alternative education routes is the reopening of imam 
hatip middle schools. Before the 4+ there were still vocational secondary schools and 
imam hatip secondary schools. 
 
Reconfiguring the curriculum: promoting religious education across all schools 
 
What we are seeing is not just the increased availability of the imam hatip 
option. Additionally, religious classes in basic schools have also increased in number. 
Prior to the 4+ reforms, there had only been introductory courses called Religion and 
Ethics where pupils supposedly learnt about ethics and general concepts of religion. As 
with the whole curriculum, the content of these courses were controlled by the MEB, 
and parents wishing their children to pursue further religious education had to send 
them to Quran Study Schools, as controlled by the Director of Religious Affairs. 
However, since the 4+ reform, pupils can also choose Quran as one of their classes in 
basic schooling. The main criticism of the reform is that it challenged the secular 
tradition in basic schooling: 
 
There is not any difference between basic and imam hatip schools. In 
basic schools you can choose Quran and Arabic as elective courses. Both 
imam hatip and basic schools have to follow the same curriculum. But 
they are increasing the number of religious classes in basic schools and 
they are trying to phase out Atatürk’s Principles and Revolution History 
classes in both schools. So, tell me how is this reform is not ideological? 
(EDJ2).  
 
Of course, this is not a case of a lack of ideological direction to schooling being 
replaced by more explicit ideological intervention for the first time. That nearly 100 
years after the Revolution schools are still teaching Atatürk’s Principles points to the 
longstanding Kemalist ideological influence on schooling, and the curriculum as a site 
of contestation over the country’s future trajectory. 
Moreover, opponents of the reform have argued that many of the newly 
introduced elective courses (such as drama, law and justice, and media literacy) which 
appear to be aimed at enriching the curriculum and promoting diversity have not, in 
fact, been applied in most schools, resulting in curriculum diversity meaning little more 
than increased religious instruction. During the interviews, some participants noted 
that pressure is placed upon pupils and their parents by school managers to choose 
certain subjects (TUP1, 6, 7 and EDJ1, 2).  
 
However, this was countered by another participant who rejected the claims 
about the reform forcing pupils to take religious classes.   
 
Nobody is forcing anyone to take the elective Quran class. They are all 
elective classes after all. Why would this be against secularism? 
Secularism means separation between the state and religion. It does 
not mean running from religious education (TUP4).  
 
Yet, what is clear is that there is still the compulsory religious class ‘Religious 
Culture and Ethics’ throughout the schooling system, and pupils with different beliefs 
do still have to attend these classes. Even though it is claimed that ‘Religious Culture 
and Ethics’ is aimed at teaching pupils about different religions, there are concerns 
that the course is actually designed to teach Sunni-Islam in spite of more than a 
quarter of the population being Alevis. 
 
The government increased the number of compulsory religious classes 
in basic schools with the new reform (…) whether they accept it or not, 
it was one of the aims of the reform. These classes should be teaching 
about religion in general, but we do not know what happens in 
classrooms (EDJ3).  
 
Even before the 4+ education reform was introduced, in 2010, the hours 
devoted to the Religion and Ethics course was increased, and instruction in this subject 
was introduced four grades earlier (from year four instead of year eight) (MEB 2012). 
In 2014, during the 19th National Education Council, Egitim-Bir-Sen and the Ministry of 
Education suggested that the Religious and Ethics course should be introduced from 
year one onwards (Hürriyet 2014). During the interviews, some participants were 
critical that these religious courses did not include any reference to other Islamic 
traditions apart from Sunni-Islam (TUP1 and TUP 2, EDJ2). In the words of a teacher 
union official: 
 
It might be true that the government tried to save the education system     
from its Kemalist structure, from the militarist understanding. Revoking 
national oath is a constructive step. When you look at the changes they 
are trying to make, they are discarding the homogenous Kemalist order, 
but they are also employing their own homogenous conservative agenda 
within the education system (TUP2). 
 
The long tradition of Kemalist hegemony has been being replaced by the JDP’s 
more Islamist hegemony. The rise of religiosity within the Turkish education system is 
a reflection of the on-going battle between secularism and Islam in the country and 
how this plays out in its education system. A representative from a religiously-oriented 
union openly stated that the previous education system did not include ‘our moral and 
religious values and the secular principles swept away any Islamic heritage we have’ 
(TUP5). They noted further:  
 
Everything was built within secularist and positivist frameworks. This 
approach led religion, and anything related to tradition to fall into a 
secondary position. That is why we find the 4+ valuable. Throughout the 
years, secularism and modernism acridly caused people to lose their 
values instead of bringing something beautiful to the table. This caused 
societal earthquakes. We find our new education system to be a 
reflection of our faith and our past (referring to the Ottoman Empire) 
(TUP5).   
 
These statements indicate that the union’s ideology is similar to that of the 
government, and further that there is a clear support for the Islamisation of the 
education system. Beyond the imam hatip issue, this extends to a move to make the 
curriculum of “regular” schools more Islamic than has hitherto been the case. 
   
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This research highlights the contested nature of the reforms and the extent to 
which participants have sought to support or challenge the government’s agenda. In 
this final section, we seek to demonstrate how teacher unions and media interests 
have been mobilised or marginalised by the state in order to either promote its own 
agenda or to silence critical discourse.  
 
Our analysis of the 4+ highlights the key role played by education in hegemony 
building in Turkey. This is not unique to the JDP administration and the 4+ reforms, but 
rather it is important to see education as a site of contestation in which ideas about 
the Turkish identity have been struggled over for many years. What we argue is that 
the 4+ reforms mark a specific phase in this process of struggle whereby the balance of 
forces has shifted decisively in favour of the current ruling party. In being able to 
promote these reforms, the JDP is in turn able to consolidate its position of strength. 
 
With regards to the education unions, several of the interview participants 
stated that only one teacher union’s opinion was taken into consideration during the 
implementation of the reform process and that this union is known to have a close 
relationship with the government (Buyruk, 2015). In contrast, union groups who 
opposed the reform felt like their opinions were ignored.  
These participants emphasised the fact that the government can ask as many 
people’s opinions as it wants, but at the end of the day if they do not take those 
(opposing) opinions into consideration, the government cannot really make any 
representations about civic participation.  
One of the major teacher unions was founded immediately after the JDP came 
to power in order to reflect a new educational discourse. Its membership has 
increased substantially over the years, and this union has become the only effective 
policy actor in developing educational policies. Most current school leaders are 
members of this union, some of whom have argued that patronage plays a key role in 
the Turkish education system whereby career progression depends on membership of 
the pro-government union (Bascia and Stevenson 2017).  
Equally, the main media outlets are owned by a few large holding companies 
and often have outside business interests. In many cases they refrain from excessive 
criticism of the government (Freedom House 2018). Thus, patronage is used to build 
hegemony and rewards compliance. 
 
Of course, there are spaces for resistance and there are unions who previously 
known to hold protests and marches against the 4+ or the government’s religious 
inclinations towards education. There are also journalists writing more critically about 
the government’s policies and reforms. However, the governmental pressure applied 
to these opposition groups has intensified since the failed coup. For some of its more 
critical respondents, the government’s approach towards such opposition has created 
a climate of fear, resulting in real constraints on the words and actions of journalists 
and educators alike. 
 
In recent years, it has been contended that the government’s control over 
media organisations, particularly newspaper publishers, has increased (Freedom 
House 2014). It could be argued that, by controlling the media, the JDP monitors the 
ways in which educational changes are reflected in the media, as the press the 
becomes “the most dynamic part of the ideological structure”(Gramsci 1971, 381). This 
illustrates our argument that in Turkey the state and the civil society are far from 
autonomous in their relationship and, to use Gramsci’s phrase, they are “one and the 
same thing” (Gramsci 1971, 60).   
 
This privileging of particular voices (pro-government unions and sympathetic 
journalists), whilst seeking to marginalise and exclude others, provides an insight into 
how hegemonic discourses are constructed within civil society. What is clear is that the 
Turkish state has worked strategically within key institutions in civil society in order to 
frame the debate about the Turkish education system and reorientate it in ways that 
promote the process of Islamisation. The process of Islamisation, with its appeal to 
large sections of conservative society, is central to securing the power base of the 
ruling party. In this way, we can see ‘hegemony building’ as a process that takes place 
at multiple levels and in myriad forms. The JDP’s 4+ education reforms are part of a 
hegemonic project intended to assert ideological power and influence within Turkish 
society. However, the reforms are themselves the outcome of an ideological struggle 
in which state power has been used to mobilise specific discourses and to marginalise 
others. Education plays a key role in civil society, whilst simultaneously being the 
outcome of civil society struggles. 
 
This data also highlights the iterative role of education in hegemony building in 
Turkey in which distinctive processes act in mutually reinforcing ways. The promotion 
of a religiously conservative education system speaks directly to the grievances of 
large sections of society who previously felt ignored by Kemalism. Here, education 
reforms have acted as a focus around which this community, both in civil society 
institutions and in the wider population, can be mobilised. The reforms, therefore, play 
a key role in broadening the hegemonic alliance that underpins the JDP’s support. 
However, imam hatip schools and the 4+ curriculum reforms also help embed a 
worldview which promotes Islam as the new common sense. In this respect, the 
reforms can be seen as building an ideological base intended to sustain support for a 
political party that has always been explicitly Islamic, i.e., non-secular. Each of these 
two elements reinforces the other by promoting Islam as the new common sense and 
providing the education system that Islamism demands. It is these mutually reinforcing 
processes that underpin what Gramsci described as ‘the fortresses and earthworks’ 
(1971, 238) of civil society, and hence of hegemonic power. 
 
 In conclusion, we have sought to demonstrate how education is central to the 
JDP’s hegemonic project.  Our argument is that education is being developed as a form 
of hegemonic power in Turkish society, but it is itself the outcome of struggles in civil 
society for hegemonic leadership. In Gramscian terms, schools are becoming a key tool 
in allowing the JDP to develop its organic intellectuals (Gramsci 1971) – a cadre of 
young JDP supporters capable of promoting the ideas of the movement within their 
communities. They are also the means through which to win the support of large 
sections of the population as part of a hegemonic alliance. They are the product of an 
alliance in which key sections civil society (unions and the media) have been mobilised 
to win support for education reforms.  
Thus, the paper adds to a growing body of literature on Gramsci and the 
relevance of his ideas in contemporary education policy contexts. It illustrates the 
argument that education acts as one of the key ideological tools through which 
governments can promote neo-conservative ideologies to future generations, but is 
itself a site of contestation (Apple 2006).  
  Finally, the relationship between the state and civil society is not autonomous, 
and civil society is certainly underdeveloped. This is evidenced by the high levels of 
coercion and authoritarian governance that are a feature of the modern Turkish state. 
The JDP government makes little effort to seriously engage with civil society in a wider 
context but rather relies on building alliances with networks of sympathetic 
organisations such as government-aligned media and trade unions. Civic participation 
is reduced to co-option of certain groups in order to strengthen the state’s hegemonic 
alliance, whilst opposition groups are at best marginalised, but in some cases are 
confronted more directly (a phenomenon that has become more transparent as the 
Turkish state has responded to the July 2016 coup). While the state is forming strategic 
alliances, it also seeks to close down the spaces for counterhegemonic discourse, and 
as indicated this situation has been exacerbated in the period following the coup.  
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